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Some theories of personal identity allow persons 
to lose their identities in processes of qualitative change, 
i.e., to become a numerically different person by getting 
new physical and/or psychological properties. I shall call 
these theories strong. Weak theories, in contrast, do not 
allow for such a loss of identity. In general, weak theories 
put less restrictions on personal identity than strong ones. I 
will argue that each type of theory faces a serious problem. 
Let me start with the strong theory which is built 
upon the notion of psychological connectedness. Suppose 
A is a person existing at a certain time, and B a person 
existing at a later time, then A and B are identical iff they 
are related by a sufficient number of direct psychological 
connections. According to Noonan (1989, 12-13) the 
following types of relations figure as direct psychological 
connections: 
Memory: B remembers some of the experiences of A. 
Intention: connections between an intention and 
the later act in which this intention is carried out.  
Persistence: connections holding when a belief, or 
a desire, or any other psychological feature, persists.  
Causality: any causal links between past factors 
and present psychological traits, including subconscious 
ones, such as links between childhood experiences and 
adult character traits, fears and prejudices. 
Psychological connectedness, given by these four 
types of connections, is a strong criterion of personal 
identity. If the mind of A has changed so dramatically that 
B bears no specific similarity to A anymore, then 
psychological connectedness might have got lost. The 
person might have lost all memories, including the 
memories of past intentions. There might be no acts of B in 
which past intentions are carried out. No relevant belief, 
desire or other psychological feature might persist. And 
though there are probably causal links between A and the 
mind of B, other causal factors might have had much 
greater impact on B. Imagine that A´s brain has been 
manipulated by a neuroscientist to implement new 
psychological features. In this case the main causal factor 
would arguably be the neurological manipulation itself, not 
the specific psychological properties of A before the 
manipulation. 
A loss of identity can occur quite rapidly, but it can 
also take place as a gradual change over a relatively long 
period of time. David Lewis (1976, 65-67) gives the 
example of Methuselah who lived for 969 years (so the 
Bible says). Assume that at the age of 900 Methuselah has 
lost almost all mental properties he had at the age of 50. 
He has lost his memories and changed his character, 
turning from a happy and optimistic young guy to a 
grumpy, pessimistic old man. According to the theory of 
psychological connectedness, Methuselah at the age of 
900 isn´t identical to Methuselah at the age of 50 – 
provided that the psychological change has been large 
enough. 
Perhaps you are still wondering, despite the 
previous example, whether there really is such a thing as a 
loss of identity. Actually, since we want to judge different 
theories as to whether they allow a person to become a 
numerically different person, we must convince ourselves 
that such a transformation is possible independently of any 
particular theory of personal identity. In short, we must not 
accept the possibility of a personality transformation 
because our favourite theory of personal identity says it is 
possible. The argument goes the other way around: first 
we must accept the possibility of personality 
transformation, then a theory not allowing for that 
transformation can be claimed to be insufficient. 
So can a person become another person? I 
personally am convinced by the example of Methuselah. If 
you are not, try to envisage more drastic changes. Imagine 
that not only the psychological, but also the physical 
properties of the person vary in a significant degree, which 
arguably happened in the case of Methuselah too. Or think 
again of neurological manipulation, or of serious forms of 
mental illness. Psychopathology provides at least prima 
facie reasons that a person can change identity, becoming 
a person who isn´t the same as the one who existed 
before.  
Strong theories, such as the theory of 
psychological connectedness, seem to be okay as far as 
loss of identity through qualitative change is concerned. 
It´s possible to lose one´s identity, and that´s what strong 
theories imply. But nevertheless they suffer from a serious 
defect, for they don´t correspond to how the notion of 
personal identity is commonly used. Among other things, it 
is used to describe the relation between babies and adults, 
especially when a person identifies with a baby who 
existed in the past. Suppose a person is watching a photo, 
saying "This is a picture of me when I was only one month 
old." Cases like this happen often enough, and they seem 
to be essential applications of our ordinary concept of 
personal identity.  
Of course, there are possible worlds in which 
persons are not born as babies and don´t grow up to 
become adults. Instead, adult people might come into 
existence, say, by some magical process. If you think that 
the concept of personal identity comprises, or should 
comprise, worlds like these too, then you are probably 
inclined to think that the identity of babies and adults isn´t 
essential to personal identity. But even then your favourite 
theory should cope with the possibility of human 
development as we know it, and therefore with the identity 
of babies and adults. In fact, what we are looking for is a 
criterion of personal identity that fits the real world, not 
some possible world in which the concept of personal 
identity has changed too. 
Unfortunately, the criterion of psychological 
connectedness does not fit with human development as 
we know it. If we are asking whether babies and adults are 
psychologically connected, the answer is likely to be no. Of 
the four types of connections mentioned before (taken 
from Noonan), the first three don´t exist. I have no 
memories of my experiences as an one-month old baby, 
nor did I have an intention, at that age, which I am now 
carrying out. And finally, there´s no persistence of a belief, 
or a desire, or any other psychological feature. Although 
the baby did have feelings of hunger, thirst and tiredness, 
which regularly affect me too, these feelings have no 
persisted during all those years. 
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While there´s no memory, no intention, and no 
persistence, there are probably relations of type 4, causal 
connections. We expect to find causal links between the 
baby and the adult. Neurological processes in the baby´s 
brain, e.g., are causally relevant to my present state of 
mind, if only in a remote way. This, however, suffices not 
to justify the claim that the baby and the adult are 
psychologically connected. In the absence of memory, 
intention and persistence, causality alone isn´t enough to 
establish psychological connectedness. 
We may conclude that according to the theory we 
are discussing at the moment, there´s no identity of the 
baby and the adult. Hence it would be literally wrong if I 
said, "This is a picture of me when I was one month old". 
But this result is quite absurd. We must not sacrifice the 
identity of babies and adults, which is an important part of 
our common-sense theory of persons, and therefore of 
how we see ourselves. Better to sacrifice the underlying 
theory: the theory that personal identity is given by 
psychological connectedness. Though this theory is 
applicable to processes in which a person becomes 
another one by changing physical and psychological 
properties, it doesn´t apply to the process in which a baby 
becomes an adult while staying the same person. 
Turning to weak theories, however, we find them 
suffering from just the opposite problem. They are 
adequate for babies growing up to become adults, but not 
for Methuselah who becomes another person. As a 
paradigm case, let us consider psychological continuity, 
which is defined by psychological connectedness: B is 
psychologically continuous with A iff there´s a chain of 
persons, beginning with A and ending with B, such that 
each link in that chain is psychologically connected to its 
predecessor.  
Since I am psychologically continuous with the 
baby who was me, I am identical to the baby who was me. 
So here the theory yields the correct conclusion. But it fails 
to describe the transformation of Methuselah in the proper 
way. Given that his transformation doesn´t occur in a 
moment but during a certain period of time, there arguably 
is a chain of psychologically connected persons linking 
Methuselah before the transformation with Methuselah 
after the transformation. Hence there´s psychological 
continuity. The theory implies that Methuselah does not 
lose his identity. 
It´s easy to see that other weak theories give the 
same result. Think of the bodily criterion saying that A and 
B are identical iff they have the same body, where the 
diachronic identity of physical bodies is preferably defined 
by spatio-temporal trajectories: a body is identical to a 
body at a later time iff they are linked by a continuous 
trajectory. (To save the logic of identity, we would have to 
exclude fission and fusion, perhaps by something like the 
closest continuer criterion of Nozick 1981, 29-37.) 
According to the bodily criterion, the adult is identical to the 
baby, but Methuselah has again not turned into another 
person, because the identity of his body – defined by the 
body´s trajectory – is conserved during the process, even 
when it undergoes great physical changes. 
So far for naturalism. We may take a look at 
supernaturalism too. Maybe personal identity is constituted 
by the continuing existence of an indivisible soul, being the 
only essential part of a person, while the body is just a 
temporary and contingent part. This is basically the 
conception presented by Swinburne (1984) as the theory 
of classical dualism. If we assume that the soul sticks to 
the person from birth to death, and that it isn´t affected by 
qualitative changes, i.e., by changes of physical or 
psychological properties, the dualist approach implies the 
preservation of the person´s identity no matter how great 
the physical and psychological changes may be. So the 
dualist approach too classifies as a weak theory of 
personal identity, containing the same defect as all the 
others. 
Any theory of personal identity is either a strong or 
a weak one, for it either admits of the loss of identity 
through qualitative change, or it doesn´t. If it doesn´t, it´s 
inadequate. If it does, however, it will fail to describe the 
relation of babies and adults as a relation of identity. 
Although there´s no conclusive proof that any strong 
theory fails to do so, there´s a good reason for this 
assumption: if the qualitative change is large enough, 
strong theories imply that the person has changed into 
some other person. But the process leading from babies to 
adults is just another qualitative change. In fact, it´s the 
largest change in a person´s life. Nevertheless we don´t 
consider it a change of identity.  
This is the reason why both strong and weak 
theories are doomed to fail. There are two kinds of 
processes, each involving a great qualitative change. A 
theory of personal identity, which could be said to be 
adequate, must describe these changes in different ways, 
one as a loss of identity, the other as a preservation of 
identity – although there´s no essential difference between 
the two change processes. The main difference lies in the 
biological fact that every adult person has once been a 
baby, whereas only a few adult people go through a real 
change of personal identity. Since we all are familiar with 
the first kind of transformation, but usually not with the 
second one, we judge them differently as far as personal 
identity is concerned. And it´s difficult, perhaps even 
impossible, to translate this contrast of attitude into a 
uniform theory. 
A theory of personal identity that would suit both 
kinds of transformations would probably be a mixture of at 
least two theories, one for babies becoming adults, and 
one for adults becoming other adults. We could call such a 
mixture a "theory", but since it contains more than one 
criterion of personal identity, there are in fact more theories 
involved than just one. Therefore it is reasonable to adopt 
the view that personal identity cannot be sufficiently 
described by one theory alone. 
Though this is a theoretical conclusion based on 
theoretical considerations, it´s also backed by pre-
philosophical discourse. People use the concept of 
personal identity in various ways, implicitly appealing to 
different identity criteria. Talking about the dead body of 
person X, e.g., people sometimes say, "This is X," implying 
that the person is just the body. But sometimes they say, 
"This is the body of X," implying that the person is not 
identical to the body. Of course, this pre-philosophical 
usage doesn´t force philosophers to accept more than one 
identity criteria, but words like "person" and "identity" 
haven´t been invented by philosophers. They have first 
been used by ordinary people. If philosophers are able to 
create a uniform theory that removes the ambiguity of pre-
philosophical discourse, then they should have a right to 
replace pre-philosophical discourse by that theory. But in 
the absence of such a theory it may be better to retain the 
ambiguity. 
I conclude with a short terminological remark. It´s 
for those who doubt that babies are persons, and therefore 
hesitate to classify the identity of babies and adults as a 
relation of personal identity. As you will know, there´s no 
agreement on what a person is. To mention just a few 
possibilities: some define persons simply as human 
beings, or as bearers of certain basic rights. Then, of 
course, babies are persons too. Others prefer to define 
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personhood through rationality, or freedom, or having 
obligations. If they are right, babies are probably no 
persons. But even if you deny that babies are persons, you 
must cope with the diachronic identity between babies and 
adults, however you call it. If babies are not persons, this 
diachronic identity is no personal identity, so we should 
give it a different name. We could provisionally call it 
"identity of human beings". In this terminology, my 
argument has not been concerned with personal identity, 
but with the identity of human beings. 
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